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Abstract 
The traditional political economy account of global climate change governance directs our attention to fundamental 
collective action problems associated with global public goods provision, resulting from positive or negative externali-
ties as well as freeriding. The governance architecture of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol uses the traditional approaches of in-
ternational diplomacy for addressing such challenges: legally binding commitments based on principles of reciprocity 
and (fair) cost/burden sharing via formalized carbon-budgeting. Yet, the 2015 Paris Agreement has essentially aban-
doned this approach, as it now operates on the basis of internationally coordinated and monitored unilateralism. On 
the presumption that public opinion matters for government policy, we examine how citizens view this shift in climate 
policy from reciprocity to unilateralism, after many years of exposure to strong reciprocity rhetoric by governments and 
stakeholders. To that end, we fielded a survey experiment in China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter. 
The results show that there is, perhaps surprisingly, strong and robust public support for unilateral, non-reciprocal cli-
mate policy. To the extent China is interested in pushing ahead with ambitious and thus costly GHG reduction policies, 
our results suggest that China can leverage segments of public support in order to overcome domestic obstacles to GHG 
mitigation policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Most global governance efforts take the form of gov-
ernment representatives negotiating an international 
agreement that specifies the rights and obligations of 
participating countries. Such agreements are then tak-
en back home and, depending on the characteristics of 
the agreement and national political institutions, are 
then subject to approval (or ratification) by govern-
ment and/or the legislature before being implemented. 
The 1992 UNFCCC and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which 
are at the center of the global climate governance sys-
tem, follow exactly that approach. Yet, efforts to nego-
tiate a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, 
which ended in 2012, failed and the more than 190 
countries involved opted for a radical departure from 
the hitherto practiced governance approach: through 
the 2015 Paris Agreement they moved away from le-
gally binding emissions targets, set at the global level, 
and opted for a much more flexible system. This new 
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system bundles unilateral promises by individual coun-
tries to engage in greenhouse gas (GHG) emission re-
ductions. In the jargon of the UNFCCC these promises, 
which are voluntary and not legally binding, are called 
INDC, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution.  
The Kyoto Protocol approach was motivated by a 
global public goods logic. Greenhouse gases (GHG) 
emitted by human or other (e.g. volcanic) activity ac-
cumulate in the atmosphere, no matter from where 
they originate. They then affect all countries via impli-
cations for temperature and the hydrological cycle, al-
beit to different degrees. These geo-physical properties 
and the associated structure of the collective action 
problem imply that, in principle, international collabo-
ration is made difficult by positive and negative exter-
nalities problems. Reducing GHG emissions in a given 
country benefits that country in the medium to long 
term by reducing climatic risks, but also benefits all oth-
er countries in that respect. This means that there is a 
positive externality problem. Since virtually all countries 
and their political leaders tend to put national benefits 
(interests) first, positive externalities discourage contri-
butions (GHG emission reductions) to the global public 
good of climate risk mitigation. Conversely, countries 
that do not reduce their emissions create additional cli-
matic risks not only for themselves, but also offload 
parts of those risks or costs on other countries (negative 
externality). Yet, such countries can still benefit from 
GHG reductions by other countries. This means that they 
can freeride on the efforts of others.  
Strong concerns over externality and freeriding 
problems, which can be found in many international 
policy areas, such as arms control, trade, finance, and 
the environment, tend to push global governance ef-
forts towards agreements based on legally binding, re-
ciprocal commitments that are subject to monitoring 
(verification) and to some form of decentralized en-
forcement. That is, countries tend to contribute in cost-
ly ways to such governance efforts only if other coun-
tries are equally (legally) committed and bound to do 
their “fair share”. A large body of academic literature 
shows that reciprocity is required for cooperation in 
many different types of social, economic, and political 
settings, from the micro- to the global level (Falk & 
Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr, 
Gächter, & Kirchsteiger, 1997; Milinski, Semmann, 
Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006). 
The 2015 Paris Agreement departs from the idea of 
a global climate governance architecture based on 
jointly agreed, legally binding reciprocal commitments. 
It compiles unilateral, voluntary pledges (INDCs) of in-
dividual governments and subjects them to a review 
process, without any formal penalties (sanctions) for 
non-compliance. This new climate governance system 
still has some elements of reciprocity. Presumably, the 
idea is to “cycle” through repeated rounds of INDCs 
and their reviews. Each country can then decide (on its 
own) whether it wants to raise or lower the ambition 
level of past and upcoming pledges, contingent on 
whether other countries have actually implemented 
their previous pledges, and what their INDC for the 
coming years looks like.  
Despite these elements of informal or vague reci-
procity, the Paris Agreement approach is primarily a 
system of internationally coordinated unilateralism. 
One key issue in this context is how far, in terms of try-
ing to meet the 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius target, gov-
ernments will be willing and able to take this approach, 
particularly in view of two types of uncertainty: first, 
uncertainty about the extent to which other countries 
will implement their INDCs (the traditional reciprocity 
and freerider problem); second, uncertainty about the 
extent to which the pledging country itself will be able 
to implement its INDCs in view of domestic political, 
economic, and technical obstacles.  
In this paper, we examine the latter issue (domestic 
uncertainty and constraints) from a public opinion per-
spective, with an empirical focus on China. Public opin-
ion has previously been shown to affect government 
policy choices in other countries (Burstein, 2003, 2014; 
Guisinger, 2009; Hicks, Milner, & Tingley, 2014; Horn-
beck, 2008; Kono, 2008; Mansfield & Milner, 2012; 
Shapiro, 2011; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995; Ur-
batsch, 2013; Wlezien, 1995). However the political 
system of China tends to make political decision-
makers somewhat less sensitive to public demands, in 
a median-voter model sense. Nevertheless, previous 
research shows that Chinese leaders are in fact quite 
responsive to public demands, particularly in the area 
of environmental policy (Johnson, 2010; Yang, 2005). 
While the presumption that the government of China is 
influencing or even shaping public opinion is quite 
plausible (but not empirically demonstrated), it is also 
plausible to assume that public opinion has some effect 
on what the government does in climate policy and 
other domains, given the research noted previously.  
Analysis of public opinion on climate policy in China 
can thus serve two purposes: first, to understand po-
tential limitations of unilateral climate policy emanat-
ing from constraints imposed on decision-makers by 
mass public opinion; second, to understand whether 
the departure from international reciprocity and the 
shift towards unilateralism, after years of strong reci-
procity rhetoric by policy-makers, lines up with or 
conflicts with the views of citizens. The latter purpose 
is important, no matter whether mass public opinion 
in fact has an influence on government policy choices, 
and whether the government shapes public opinion, 
rather than public opinion shaping government poli-
cies, or vice versa. Moreover, in practical terms, un-
derstanding public opinion on this issue in China is 
relevant also because China accounts for 11% of total 
historical CO2 emissions since 1850, and 30% of global 
emissions in 2014 (PBL Netherlands Environmental As-
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sessment Agency, 2015; World Resources Institute, 
2013). 
To shed light on the extent to which the public in 
China supports unilateral climate policy we use two 
experiments embedded in a survey using an online 
convenience sample. In one experiment we randomly 
assigned different frames to an item measuring re-
spondents’ attitudes towards reciprocal vs unilateral 
climate policy. In the other experiment we primed re-
spondents with positive or negative information about 
the climate policies of other countries. Overall, we find 
surprisingly robust support for unilateral climate policy 
in China within our sample, reinforcing previous sur-
veys that find the Chinese population believes China 
has a responsibility to take unilateral steps against cli-
mate change (World Bank, 2010). This leaves some 
room for optimism about Chinese policy-makers being 
willing and able, despite strong countervailing pressure 
by polluting industries, which tend to demand “softer” 
policies justified by international level playing field and 
cost arguments, to set up ambitious INDCs and effec-
tively implement them.  
2. Argument 
Ever since negotiations on a global climate governance 
system began in the early 1990s, government repre-
sentatives have demanded reciprocity, in the sense of 
requesting a “fair” contribution from each country in-
volved. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol with its formal reduc-
tion targets and monitoring mechanism reflects these 
demands. This rhetoric and its legal and organizational 
reflection in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol process is 
somewhat at odds with the many local, national, and 
regional climate policy initiatives, which are predomi-
nantly non-reciprocal, that is unilateral and not explic-
itly contingent on what other political units (notably, 
countries) do. Moreover, information from the very 
few surveys that have examined citizens’ attitudes to-
wards unilateral vs reciprocal climate policy (Bernauer 
& Gampfer, 2015; World Bank, 2010) observe rather 
high levels of support for unilateral climate policy.  
Have governments actually missed out on opportu-
nities to install more ambitious climate policies unilat-
erally, while global climate negotiations were stalling 
over the past 10–15 years, due to polluting industry 
pressure or other reasons (e.g. ignorance of govern-
ments about citizens’ attitudes)? Or is there something 
wrong with survey measurement instruments that made 
them overstate public support for unilateral climate pol-
icy, due to social desirability bias or other factors? 
Using a framing experiment embedded in a popula-
tion based survey in the United States and India, Ber-
nauer and Gampfer (2015) found that mass public sup-
port for unilateral climate policy was stronger than 
expected. Or, conversely, citizens appear to be surpris-
ingly non-reciprocal, relative to what government 
rhetoric in climate negotiations would suggest. The 
study also shows that strong support for unilateral cli-
mate policy, which is incompatible with standard theo-
ry on global public goods, is not the result of citizens 
being poorly informed about climate policy and its cost 
implications, which might lead to inflated support due 
to social desirability bias in survey responses. We build 
on that work, add another experiment, and focus on 
China, for which there is very little information on pub-
lic opinion concerning climate change and climate 
change policy. 
The arguments to be tested in our two experiments 
center on how strong public support for unilateral cli-
mate policy actually is, and whether it is susceptible to 
framing and priming effects. In the first experiment, we 
expect information about ambitious GHG mitigation 
measures in other key countries to increase support for 
unilateral climate policy, and information about non-
ambitious measures in other key countries to have a 
negative effect. Taken together, the two experiments 
provide insights into how strong public support for uni-
lateral climate policy in China is. In the second experi-
ment, we expect support for unilateral climate policy 
to increase with positive frames: co-benefits, such as 
green jobs and technological innovation, effectiveness 
of unilateral policies in helping to solve the climate 
change problem, adaptation focus of climate policy, 
safeguards provisions for responding to “abstinence” 
or “free-riding” of other countries, leading by example 
(positive diffusion effect), and demonstrating global 
leadership. Conversely, we expect negative frames to 
reduce support for unilateral climate policy: high costs, 
freeriding by others, and mitigation (as opposed to ad-
aptation measures). 
3. China’s Climate Policy 
Before turning to the experimental design, we provide a 
very brief summary of China’s climate change policy in 
order to contextualize our study and its results. In par-
ticular, we focus on how China’s climate policy relates to 
its participation in international climate negotiations. 
Within global climate change negotiations China has 
long taken the position that any international climate 
agreement should be based on the principles of histori-
cal and differentiated responsibility. In this context Chi-
na considers itself to be a developing country (Pan, 
Chen, Zhang, Bao, & Zhang, 2015; Xie, 2010). Therefore, 
it has taken the position that it should incur less of the 
burden for climate change mitigation, compared to de-
veloped countries with long histories of large-scale GHG 
emissions. Nevertheless, maintaining such a position has 
turned out to be more difficult in recent years, as China 
has become the second largest economy in the world 
and the world’s largest (current) GHG emitter (http:// 
www.wri.org/publication/assessing-implementation-chi 
nas-climate-policies-12th-5-year-period).  
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Furthermore, a key stance in China’s international 
climate policy position has been opposition to accept-
ing internationally set and legally binding GHG reduc-
tion obligations. Although China has often called on 
developed countries to agree to legally binding com-
mitments to reduce GHG emissions and provide finan-
cial support for developing countries, it has argued that 
developing countries’ efforts to deal with climate 
change should be voluntary and reflect current capaci-
ty (Xie, 2010; Zhang, 2013). As China considers itself a 
developing country in this case, it has been unwilling to 
accept legally binding commitments through interna-
tional negotiations.  
Even though China has long opposed mandatory in-
ternational GHG emissions targets for developing coun-
tries, including China, it has in recent years made im-
portant pledges and has adopted substantial measures 
to unilaterally tackle climate change. Most notably, in 
2015 the Chinese government announced that it plans 
to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60–65% 
over the period of 2005 to 2030 (Climate Action Track-
er, 2014; Energy Research Institute 2015; Green & 
Stern, 2015). This pledge has been coupled with large 
investments into energy production from renewables 
(Energy Research Institute, 2015; World Resources In-
stitute, 2015).  
4. Study Design 
4.1. Sampling 
We recruited 1067 participants through social media 
networks, including WeChat (Weixin in Mandarin) and 
Sina Weibo. WeChat is a mobile text and voice messag-
ing and communication service developed by Tencent.1 
Sina Weibo is a Chinese microblogging (weibo) website 
developed by SINA Corporation.2 It is somewhat similar 
to Twitter or Facebook. While our sample is a conven-
ience sample, this does not affect the internal validity 
of our estimated treatment effects, in which we are in-
terested in this paper. However, it does mean that we 
cannot generalize the description of attitudes and 
treatment effects to the general Chinese population. 
The socio-demographics of our sample are shown in 
the Appendix 1. These statistics show that our sample 
is younger and better educated, relative to the overall 
distribution in China. For example, approximately 60% 
of our sample is aged between 20 and 30, compared to 
approximately 9% of the population (CIA, 2016). Ap-
proximately 90% is currently attending university or 
has a university degree, compared to 17.95% of people 
aged 25–34 in the population (OECD, 2016). Our survey 
can thus be regarded as some form of elite survey.  
While this sample bias and the opt-in approach to 
                                                          
1 https://web.wechat.com 
2 http://weibo.com 
sampling does not allow for representative inferences 
about what the Chinese populations’ attitudes are, this 
limitation is not relevant in our case, because it still al-
lows us to identify average treatment effects within 
our sample. In addition, it offers insights into the atti-
tudes and preferences of relatively well-educated Chi-
nese citizens, whose opinions are more likely to affect 
policy-making than opinions among less educated parts 
of the population. 
4.2. Survey Instrument and Embedded Experiments 
The survey3 into which the experiments were embed-
ded has the following structure: 
1. Socio-Demographic items 
2. Items about interest and belief in global warm-
ing/climate change 
3. Survey experiment 1 
4. Items for the outcome measures for experi-
ment 1 
5. Survey experiment 2 
6. Items for the outcome measures for experi-
ment 2 
The first experiment exposed respondents to in-
formation about ambitious or non-ambitious GHG mit-
igation policies of other countries that are, from the 
viewpoint of their emissions, important to the long-
term success of global climate risk mitigation, notably 
the United States, the European Union (EU), and India. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 6 
treatments (i.e., short pieces of information) shown in 
Table 1, which comes in the form of a piece of text be-
fore moving on to the outcome questions. We de-
signed the treatment texts so that they include infor-
mation on pledges to reduce GHG emissions (which 
correspond to pledges the respective country [or EU] 
has actually made), and also (fictional) information on 
what (unnamed) experts think about the respective 
pledge, in terms of it being fair and corresponding to 
the respective country’s (or EU) capability and respon-
sibility. This treatment design makes the treatments as 
homogenous as possible in terms of their structure 
(though not content in terms of negative or positive 
priming). 
After randomly assigned exposure to one of the 
treatments (or control) shown in Table 1, we measured 
each respondent’s attitudes towards China’s climate 
policy, based on a wide range of survey items. These 
are displayed in Table 2. In order to avoid social desira-
bility bias, we emphasize cost implications at the na-
tional and individual level in many of the listed survey 
items. 
                                                          
3 The survey instrument in Mandarin is available from 
the authors on request. 
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Table 1. Treatment conditions for experiment 1.4 
USA Positive The United States has promised that it will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 14–17% 
below 1990 levels by 2025. Most experts think this is a fair contribution by the United States to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, since it reflects the United States’ capability and 
responsibility. 
USA Negative The United States has promised that it will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 14–17% 
below 1990 levels by 2025. Most experts think this is not a fair contribution by the United States 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, since it does not reflect the United States’ 
capability and responsibility. 
India Positive India has promised that it will reduce the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of its GDP by 20–
25% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels. Most experts think this is a fair contribution by India to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, since it reflects India’s capability and 
responsibility. 
India Negative India has promised that it will reduce the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of its GDP by 20–
25% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels. Most experts think this is not a fair contribution by India 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, since it does not reflect India’s capability and 
responsibility 
EU Positive The European Union has promised that it will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below 
1990 levels by 2030. Most experts think this is a fair contribution by the European Union to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, since it reflects the European Union’ capability 
and responsibility. 
EU Negative The European Union has promised that it will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below 
1990 levels by 2030. Most experts think this is not a fair contribution by the European Union to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, since it does not reflect the European Union’ 
capability and responsibility. 
Control group (no information treatment) 
Table 2. Attitudes towards climate policy. 
People hold different views about whether China should give 
priority to measures against global warming, even if such 
measures have a negative effect on the Chinese economy. 
What is your view?  
1 Should give priority to measures against global 
warming 
2 Should not give priority to measures against global 
warming  
3 Don’t know  
To deal with global warming, do you think China is doing… 1 Too much  
2 About the right amount  
3 Not enough  
4 Don’t know 
Do you favor or oppose preserving or expanding forested 
areas in China, even if this means less land for agriculture or 
construction in China? 
1 Favor strongly 
2 Favor somewhat 
3 Oppose somewhat 
4 Oppose strongly 
5 Don’t know 
Do you favor or oppose increasing the requirements for fuel 
efficiency of automobiles in China, even if this raises the cost 
of cars and bus fares in China?  
1 Favor strongly 
2 Favor somewhat 
3 Oppose somewhat 
4 Oppose strongly 
5 Don’t know 
                                                          
4 We provide the English translation here.  
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 152-171 157 
Imagine that if China took effective steps against global 
warming, this would increase electricity costs to the average 
household in China by 30 RMB per month. Would you be 
willing or not be willing to pay this additional cost as part of 
taking steps against global warming?  
1 Would be willing 
2 Would not be willing 
3 Don’t know  
Could you please tell us to what extent you personally agree 
or disagree with the following statements? 
 
If I had to reduce my energy consumption and carbon dioxide 
emissions this would reduce my quality of life too much. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Mostly agree 
3 Mostly disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
If I avoid activities that emit carbon dioxide I contribute to 
solving the problem of global warming.  
1 Strongly agree 
2 Mostly agree 
3 Mostly disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
I prefer to enjoy life without having to worry about how 
much energy I consume and how much carbon dioxide I emit. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Mostly agree 
3 Mostly disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
Imagine you were buying a car and you had to choose 
between a larger, more powerful car that consumes more 
fuel, and a smaller and less powerful car that consumes less 
fuel. Assume that this would be the only car you own, and 
that both the large and the small car cost exactly the same. 
Which car would you buy? 
1 Larger, more powerful car consuming more fuel 
2 Smaller, less powerful car consuming less fuel 
Which of the following statements comes closest to your own 
point of view? China should reduce its carbon dioxide 
emissions… 
1 regardless of what other countries do 
2 only if industrialized countries (such as the United 
States, Germany, Japan) reduce their emissions  
3 only if industrialized countries (such as the United 
States, Germany, Japan) as well as developing 
countries (such as India, Brazil) reduce their 
emissions 
4 China should not reduce its carbon dioxide 
emissions 
 
To minimize measurement errors, and because it 
seems impossible to capture preferences concerning 
climate policy with one single survey item, we aggre-
gated the answers to these 10 survey items into a sin-
gle scale using Bayesian ordinal factor analysis. The 
posterior median of the latent variable is used as the 
outcome measure for each respondent. This depend-
ent variable is standardized to have a mean of zero and 
standard deviation equal to one, for ease of interpreta-
tion. In the analysis that follows we only include re-
spondents who answered all of these 10 questions in 
the survey. This leaves 758 respondents for the statisti-
cal analysis, with similar numbers of respondents in 
each treatment condition. 
The second experiment is a framing experiment, 
where the frame (a piece of text) is inserted into a 
baseline survey item. This baseline item asks respond-
ents whether they believe China should reduce its car-
bon dioxide emissions (identical to the final question 
used for the first experiment): 
 regardless what other countries do 
 only if industrialized countries (such as the United 
States, Germany, Japan) reduce their emissions  
 only if industrialized countries (such as the United 
States, Germany, Japan) as well as developing coun-
tries (such as India, Brazil) reduce their emissions 
“China should not reduce its carbon dioxide emis-
sions” was also added as a response category to take 
care of the possibility that some respondents may pre-
fer China not to reduce its emissions, no matter what 
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other countries do. 35 respondents did not answer this 
question, leaving 1032 respondents for the statistical 
analysis. 
Survey participants were then randomly assigned to 
one of the following frames, with the baseline item 
(not including a frame) serving as the control group:  
 Many experts argue, however, that emission re-
ductions by China would be very costly and would 
hurt the Chinese economy. (Expected framing ef-
fect: negative) 
 Many experts argue, however, that emission re-
ductions by China could also contribute to techno-
logical innovation and create more jobs in China. 
(Expected framing effect: positive) 
 Many experts argue, however, that reducing car-
bon dioxide emissions in China would also help re-
duce local air pollution, which is severe in many 
Chinese cities. (Expected framing effect: positive) 
 Many experts argue, however, that emission re-
ductions by China would motivate other countries 
to follow the Chinese example and reduce their 
emissions as well. (Expected framing effect: positive) 
 Many experts argue, however, that emission re-
ductions by China are required to demonstrate 
China’s global political leadership. (Expected fram-
ing effect: positive) 
 Many experts argue, however, that China is re-
sponsible for only around 29% of total carbon diox-
ide emissions worldwide. Hence they argue that 
the global warming problem cannot be solved if 
China reduces its emissions on its own, but other 
countries do not do the same. (Expected framing 
effect: negative) 
 Many experts argue, however, that reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions is expensive. Therefore, if China 
reduces its emissions, but other countries do not, 
Chinese businesses and their exports to other coun-
tries will become less competitive and jobs in China 
may be lost. (Expected framing effect: negative) 
 At recent international climate conferences, the 
political leaders of industrialized countries have 
agreed to provide large amounts of funding and 
technology to facilitate the reduction of carbon di-
oxide emissions in developing countries, including 
China. (Expected framing effect: positive) 
5. Results 
5.1. Experiment 1 
For experiment 1, which focuses on information about 
other countries mitigation efforts, we start by examin-
ing the distribution of the outcome measure (depend-
ent variable) across each of the experimental condi-
tions. The results show that the variance in support for 
climate policy, as captured by our composite measure 
based on 11 survey items, is similarly dispersed across 
all experimental conditions. However, the mean tends 
to be lower in the control group compared to the 
treatment conditions (see Figure 1). 
We then estimated the average treatment effects 
using ordinary least squares regression. Figure 2 pre-
sents these treatment effects. 
Surprisingly, the results show positive treatment ef-
fects for all treatment conditions. Thus any information 
about GHG reduction policy in other key countries, no 
matter whether positive or negative, tends to induce 
more climate policy support. However the 90% confi-
dence intervals for these treatment effects do not in-
clude zero only for the United States treatments, when 
not including demographic controls, and for the posi-
tive United States treatment, when including demo-
graphic controls. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of outcome measure by treatment condition, experiment 1. Notes: Points indicate the mean 
score on the outcome variable. The horizontal dashed line indicates the global mean. 
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Figure 2. Estimated treatment effects, experiment 1. Note: The panel on the left shows the estimates without demo-
graphic controls, the panel on the right shows the estimates with demographic controls (age, region, education, profes-
sion, and gender). The bullet points on the wiskers indicate the average treatment effects. Broad horizontal wiskers in-
dicate 90% and narrower wiskers 95% confidence intervals. If confidence intervals intersect with the dotted vertical line 
the estimated treatment effect is not statistically significant. 
The direction of these results suggests that any in-
formation on emission reductions increases support 
climate policy in our sample. This is particularly the 
case for the United States treatments, where the nega-
tive information on climate policy by the United States 
has a similarly sized effect to that of the positive infor-
mation concerning climate policy by India. One inter-
pretation of this result is that respondents take the 14–
17% GHG reductions noted in the US treatment condi-
tion to be, overall, a good thing, even though the 
treatment also states that experts consider the size of 
reduction not to be a fair contribution in view of US 
capacity and historical emissions.  
Next we focus on the comparison between the pos-
itive and negative treatment effects for a given coun-
try. These results are more in line with our theoretical 
expectations. For both India and the United States, 
positive treatments are associated with more climate 
policy support than negative treatments. Yet, contrary 
to our expectations the difference in climate policy 
support between the positive and negative EU treat-
ments is slightly negative. 
While the effect of the positive treatment concern-
ing the United States is statistically significantly differ-
ent from the control group, we would like to compare 
also if it is statistically significantly different from the 
effect of the associated negative treatment. Therefore, 
in Figure 3 we plot the estimated differences between 
the positive and negative treatments, for each coun-
try/group of countries. This is the average treatment 
effect of having received a positive treatment relative 
to a negative treatment. 
The results shown in Figure 3 indicate that the ef-
fect of receiving a positive treatment compared to a 
negative treatment is similarly positive when the refer-
ence country is the United States or India. These ef-
fects lead to an approximate increase of 15% of a 
standard deviation in climate policy support. In con-
trast, the effect of a positive treatment compared to a 
negative treatment when the reference countries are 
the EU, is very close to zero and in fact slightly nega-
tive. None of these differences in treatment effects are 
statistically significant at conventional levels, however.  
5.2. Experiment 2 
We now turn to experiment 2, which provides re-
spondents’ positive or negative views about reducing 
emissions without any information about other coun-
tries. Figure 4 displays the distribution of responses to 
the survey item that forms the basis of the second ex-
periment. 
Visual inspection of Figure 4 shows that the share 
of strong supporters of unilateral climate policy (the 
black parts of the bars) remains in the order of 50–
65%. The distribution of responses in China is thus simi-
lar to those found for India by Bernauer and Gampfer 
(2015), with very low support for not reducing GHG 
emissions at all and similar levels of support for unilat-
eral climate policy across treatment and control condi-
tions. A key difference, however, is the nature of reci-
procity preferences exhibited between the two 
samples. For instance, in Bernauer and Gampfer 
(2015), of those respondents from India who support 
climate policy only if other countries act as well, the 
vast majority are primarily concerned with whether in-
dustrialized countries reduce their GHG emissions too. 
In contrast, within the China sample, those respondents
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Figure 3. Estimated differences in climate policy support between positive and negative treatments for a given refer-
ence country/group of countries. Notes: see notes for Figure 2 on how to read and interpret Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of responses, by treatment condition, in experiment 2. 
focus on both the actions of industrialized and devel-
oping countries. 
We again estimate average treatment effects for this 
outcome measure using ordinary least squares regres-
sion both with and without demographic controls. Thus 
for this present analysis we treat the ordinal dependent 
variable as if it were measured on the interval level.5 
These estimates can be interpreted as how the mean re-
                                                          
5 Results are similar when using an ordinal logit estima-
tor. The predicted probabilities generated from doing so 
are displayed in figure 6 of the appendix. 
sponse differs between a given treatment condition and 
the control group. Figure 5 displays the results. 
The results shown in Figure 5 do not support the 
expectations outlined above. None of the frames are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. In terms 
of the direction of the treatment effect, for the five 
frames we expected to have a positive treatment effect 
(technological innovation, reducing pollution, motivat-
ing other countries, leadership, and improved funding 
prospects), only the motivation frame has a positive ef-
fect. The others have either very small negative effects 
that are close to zero, or in the case of leadership have
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Figure 5. Estimated treatment effects, experiment 2. Notes: see notes for Figure 2 on how to read and interpret Figure 
5. Treatment effects are grouped by whether we expected positive or negative effects, and whether demographic con-
trols are included or not. 
fairly strong negative effects. For those frames we ex-
pected to have negative treatment effects (free-riding, 
costs, and competitive disadvantage) two of the three 
do indeed have relatively strong negative effects on 
support for unilateral climate policy. However, the 
costs frame has a slightly positive effect, again running 
counter to our expectations. 
In brief, support for unilateral climate policy, within 
our sample, is quite high and changes little across the 
particular frames we randomly allocated participants to.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
The main purpose of the research presented in this pa-
per was to explore the extent to which citizens support 
what has recently become the new overall approach to 
global climate change governance, namely internation-
ally coordinated unilateralism, in the form of INDCs. 
Conventional political economy accounts of global pub-
lic goods provision as well as strong reciprocity rhetoric 
by most governments and stakeholders over the past 
two to three decades should make us skeptical about 
whether public support for unilateral climate policy 
lines up well with the recent shift in the global climate 
governance architecture. Moreover, even though exist-
ing survey data on unilateral climate policy prefer-
ences, which is very scarce, suggests rather high level 
of support, there is a possibility that measured support 
levels are inflated because of social desirability bias.  
To assess how strong public support for unilateral 
climate policy really is we implemented a survey exper-
iment in China, the world’s largest GHG emitter. In ex-
periment 1 we find that information treatments class-
ing GHG emission reduction policies of the USA as posi-
tive have a statistically significant effect in increasing 
support for climate policies. However all of the treat-
ment conditions, whether framing emission reductions 
in a positive or negative light, also lead higher average 
levels of support relative to the control group, although 
not statistically significantly so. In experiment 2 we find 
results similar to those for India in a recent publication 
by Bernauer and Gampfer (2015). Specifically, we ob-
serve high levels of support for unilateral climate policy 
in our Chinese sample, and very low levels of support 
for never reducing carbon dioxide emissions. In addi-
tion, we find that framing of GHG emission reductions 
in positive or negative lights does not significantly alter 
levels of support. In other words, we find that support 
for unilateral climate policy is rather strong and also 
robust, in the sense of not changing significantly even 
when participants are treated with information on pos-
itive or negative consequences of unilateral climate 
policy, or with negative news on GHG reduction poli-
cies of other key countries. 
The main policy implication we can draw from this 
evidence is that, to the extent the Chinese government 
is interested in pushing ahead with ambitious and thus 
costly GHG reduction policies, it should be able to lev-
erage segments of public support in order to overcome 
domestic obstacles to GHG mitigation policies. 
We conclude with two caveats and options for fur-
ther research. To start with, we opted for a conven-
ience sampling approach because we were mainly in-
terested in studying experimental treatment effects. 
However, it would also be useful to describe and ex-
plain unilateral or reciprocal climate policy preferences 
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of the mass population in China. Related to that, it 
would be interesting to find out whether preferences 
differ between the country’s elite (in terms of educa-
tion levels and income) and the mass public, and if so 
why. Furthermore, the weak treatment effects found 
may be a result of ceiling effects due to our sample 
likely over representing individuals with strong prior 
support for climate policy. Another caveat is that lim-
ited knowledge of climate policy issues combined with 
the cost implications of ambitious climate policy being 
hard to anticipate might create a risk of social desirabil-
ity bias and inflated levels of support for unilateral cli-
mate policy. We think that our experimental designs 
are able to deal with this challenge quite effectively. 
However, further research could make treatment con-
ditions (e.g. those focusing on what other countries do) 
even more explicit and go further in increasing the per-
sonal stakes associated with responses (e.g. in terms of 
using substantive willingness to pay, rather than will-
ingness to support measures).  
These caveats notwithstanding, the research pre-
sented here offers interesting starting points for inquir-
ies into the potential and limitations of non-reciprocal 
(i.e. unilateral) climate policy. At least for the time be-
ing, it appears unlikely that the global climate govern-
ance architecture will revert to a formalized, top–down 
target setting and cost- and burden-sharing approach. 
Because of that, it is important to understand how far 
citizens, who are asked to shoulder the costs of GHG 
reductions, are willing to accept costly unilateral cli-
mate policies. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Distribution of socio-demographic information in our sample. 
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Appendix 2. Distribution of socio-demographic information across treatment conditions. 
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Figure 6. How the probability of response for each category of the outcome measure varies by treatment condition, for 
experiment 2. Dots indicate point estimates, thick and thin horizontal lines indicate 90% and 95% confidence intervals 
respectively. 
 
